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DAVIDSON v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION: REEXAMINING MARY-
LAND'S ILLINOIS BRICK BAR AGAINST INDIRECT PRIVATE 
PURCHASERS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A threejudge panel of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
provided the first reported decision on Maryland's Illinois Brick re-
pealer statute regarding private party indirect purchasers. I It held 
that private indirect purchasers in antitrust claims, pursuant to the 
Maryland Antitrust Act ("MATA"), were barred by the Rule of Illinois 
Brick. 2 Indirect purchasers, unlike direct purchasers of products, are 
purchasers" [i]n the distribution chain[;] they are not the immediate 
buyers from the alleged antitrust violators."3 In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illi-
nois, the Supreme Court crafted the Rule of Illinois Brick, generally 
prohibiting federal antitrust claims for monetary damages by indirect 
purchasers.4 The Court would later explain in California v. ARC 
America Corp. that Illinois Brick was limited to an interpretation of fed-
erallaw and not necessarily binding precedent interpreting state anti-
trust statutes.5 Consistent with this holding, the MATA, as amended 
with its Illinois Brick repealer statute in 1982, explicitly allows govern-
l. Davidson v. Microsoft Corp., 143 Md. App. 43, 792 A.2d 336 (2002), cen. 
denied, 369 Md. 571, 801 A.2d 1032 (2002) [hereinafter Davidson II]. 
2. Id. at 56, 792 A.2d at 344 (holding that licensees were indirect purchasers 
pursuant to the Rule of Illinois Brick and could not sustain an injury to bring 
suit under the MATA). 
3. Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199,207 (1990). Another practi-
cal definition is: "A direct purchaser is one who purchases directly from a 
price-fixer. An indirect, downstream, purchaser is one who purchases a 
price-fixed product from a middleman, who will have in large measure 
passed-on' the anticompetitive overcharge to his customer." Thomas 
Greene et al., Practising Law Institute Carporate Law and Practice Course Hand-
book Series: State Antitrust Law and Enforcement, 1252 PRAC. L. INsT. CORP. L. & 
PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 1129, 1153 (2001) (citing Robert G. Harris 
& Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive 
Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 269 (1979». 
4. 431 U.S. 720, 747 (1977). Illinois Brick did recognize limited exceptions to 
the prohibition on indirect purchaser antitrust lawsuits. See California v. 
ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 97 n.2 (1989) (noting that either a cost-plus 
contract or a controlling relationship between the alleged monopolist and 
the direct purchaser were explicit exceptions contemplated in Illinois 
Brick); see also infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. The Rule of Illinois 
Brick is limited to damages claims only; Illinois Brick would not preclude a 
private party indirect purchaser suit seeking injunctive relief. See Ill. Brick 
Co., 431 U.S. at 747 n.3l. 
5. 490 U.S. at 105. 
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ment indirect purchasers to recover from antitrust overcharges, but is 
silent regarding private party indirect purchasers.6 
The class action suit brought by computer software licensees against 
the Microsoft Corporation, pursuant to the MATA, was dismissed by 
the Circuit Court for Prince George's County in February, 2001. 7 The 
circuit court's dismissal relied on Illinois Brick, as guided by Maryland 
Commercial Law section 11-209,8 and Judge Motz's decision in the 
United States District Court for the District of Maryland, which dis-
missed a concurrent consolidated private parties' indirect purchaser 
claim under the Rule of Illinois Brick.9 
The court of special appeals held that private party indirect pur-
chasers were barred from treble-damages claims, pursuant to the 
MATA, by the Rule of Illinois Brick.lO While the court of special ap-
peals' two-to-one decision marks the end of this litigation, the court 
acknowledged that an indirect party purchaser, like the state of Mary-
land, may have a cause of action under state law in pursuing antitrust 
litigation against the operating system and software manufacturer. 11 
Judge Sonner's dissenting opinion revealed a statutory inconsis-
tency in the majority's application of federal antitrust statutory inter-
pretations as binding guidelines for interpreting the MATAI2 Judge 
Sonner also implied that the legal rationales, supporting the major-
ity's application of Illinois Brick to software licensors, may be undercut 
6. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-209(b) (2000). Before Davidson v. 
Microsoft Corp., the MATA's application to a private party's indirect pur-
chaser antitrust claim had never been tested in a reported opinion. See 
Jeffrey L. Kessler & Michael K. Lindsay, State Antitrust Practice and Statutes: 
State of Maryland, 2 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. ST. ANTITRUST PRAC. & STAT-
UTES 22-24 (2d ed. 1999). 
7. Davidson v. Microsoft Corp., No. CAL00-07040, 2001 WL 514369, at *1 
(Md. Cir. Ct. Feb. 14,2001), affd, 143 Md. App. 43, 792 A.2d 336 (2002) 
[hereinafter Davidson I]. 
8. See id. at *1-*2. 
9. In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 711-13 (D. Md. 
2001). 
10. Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 56-57, 792 A.2d at 344-45. 
11. See id. at 63, 792 A.2d at 348. Section 11-209 of the Maryland Commercial 
Law Article states that "the State, or any political subdivision organized 
under the authority of this State may maintain an action ... regardless of 
whether it dealt directly or indirectly with the person who has committed 
the violation." MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-209 (b) (2)(ii). Rather 
than seeking monetary damages, Maryland joined the proposed consent 
decree between the federal government and Microsoft in United States v. 
Microsoft Corp. United States Memorandum Regarding Modifications Con-
tained in Second Revised Proposed Final Judgment, United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2002). The proposed decree 
was conditionally approved by Judge Kollar-Kotelly on November 1, 2002. 
Id.; see also New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d. 76 (D.D.C. 2002). 
12. Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 60-61,792 A.2d at 347 (Sonner,]., dissenting) 
(noting that Maryland's antitrust law "states [that courts] should be guided 
by federal court interpretations of federal statutes dealing with antitrust vio-
lations"). See also MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-202(a) (2). 
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by modern economic analysis. 13 A specific economic basis for this 
shift, however, was not explained. 14 
As a result, future private party indirect purchasers may bring anti-
trust lawsuits only for injunctive relief without an additional explicit 
Illinois Brick repealer amendment to the MATA. 15 Until the Maryland 
legislature, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, or the Supreme Court 
recognizes the economic shift described above, private party indirect 
purchasers will be unable to receive treble-damage awards for viola-
tions of the MAT A. 
This case comment will review the application of the Rule of Illinois 
Brick to Maryland's holding in Davidson v. Microsoft Corp. Part II begins 
with the conception of the Rule of Illinois Brick and the policies sup-
porting it. This comment's legal analysis will describe the subsequent 
backlash against Illinois Brick by the states in the adoption of repealer 
statutes and the Supreme Court's approval of them in ARC America. 
The analysis will include a brief survey of Illinois Brick repealer statutes 
and will acknowledge the pro-indirect purchaser interpretations of 
some states with silent or ambiguous statutes. Part III will examine the 
MATA and Maryland's Illinois Brick repealer statute, which amended 
the MATA in 1982 in this context. 
Part IV of this comment will review the holding and dissent in Da-
vidson in light of the Maryland General Assembly's guidance in section 
11-202 of the Maryland Commercial Code to follow the federal court's 
interpretation of Illinois Brick. The analysis will be complemented by a 
survey of relevant private party antitrust litigation against Microsoft, 
pursuant to their respective state statutes, following the settlement of 
the DOl's litigation against the software and operating system 
manufacturer. 
Part V will describe the future of antitrust claims by indirect pur-
chasers in Maryland. While this concludes the options for the party 
litigants in Davidson, Part V will embark on a review of economic anal-
yses that have been successful in implementing antitrust law. These 
intrinsic and applied economic tools may be used by future plaintiffs 
or legislators in repealing Maryland's adherence to the Rule of Illinois 
Brick. These tools may also allow future private party indirect pur-
chaser plaintiffs to successfully bring treble-damage lawsuits against al-
leged antitrust violators and defeat summary judgment in Maryland's 
courts. 
13. Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 59,792 A.2d at 346 (Sonner,]., dissenting). 
14. Id. Appellants' brief to the court of special appeals advanced legal theories 
and factual differences, not economic theories, in their attempt to reverse 
the trial court's summary dismissal. Brief for Appellant at 6-28, Davidson II, 
143 Md. App. 43, 792 A.2d 336 (2002) (No. 2001-00060). 
15. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-209(b). 
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II. LEGAL DOCTRINE 
A. The Genesis of the Rule of Illinois Brick 
[W]e decline to abandon the construction given § 4 [of the Clayton 
Act}-that the overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the 
chain of manufacture or distribution, is the party 'injured in his 
business or property' . . . -in the absence of a convincing demon-
stration that the Court was wrong. . . .16 
Federal antitrust law under § 4 of the Clayton Act creates a cause of 
action for "any person who shall be injured in his business or property 
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws .... "17 Thus, 
Congress explicitly created a right for private parties injured under 
federal antitrust law without specific qualifications. 18 Section 4 of the 
Clayton Act "does not confine its protection to consumers, or to pur-
chasers, or to competitors, or to sellers ... (but) is comprehensive in 
its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the 
forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated."19 
The Court faced a new challenge in interpreting the Clayton Act 
regarding indirect purchasers in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Ma-
chinery Corp.20 The Court rejected United Shoe's defense that Hano-
ver, as a direct purchaser, could not have incurred damages from an 
antitrust claim when the alleged illegal monopoly overcharge was 
"passed-on" to the plaintiff's consumers.21 United Shoe's failed de-
fense against Hanover alleged that Hanover had been compensated 
for United's monopoly price by raising the market price of its shoes to 
its own consumers and subsequently should not be rewarded with an-
titrust treble-damages.22 
16. Ill. Brick Co., 431 V.S. at 729. 
17. The Clayton Act, 15 V.S.C. § 15(a) (2000). 
18. Id. 
19. Ill. Brick Co., 431 V.S. at 748 (Brennan,]', dissenting) (quoting Mandeville 
Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 V.S. 219, 236 (1948»; see 
also Cynthia Vrda Kassis, The Indirect Purchaser's Right to Sue Under Section 4 of 
the Clayton Act: Another Congressional Response to Illinois Brick, 32 AM. V. L. 
REv. 1087, 1098 (1983). 
20. 392 V.S. 481, 488 (1968) (holding that a defense against a direct purchaser 
for violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act pursuant to the Clayton Act of 
"passing-on" costs was impermissible). 
21. Hanover Shoe, Inc., 392 V.S. at 488-89. The term "pass-on" describes "the 
process by which a middleman in the chain of distribution who has been 
overcharged by a manufacturer or by a producer adjusts his prices upward 
so as to pass-on his increased costs to his own customers." Elaine K Zipp, 
Annotation, Right of Retail Buyer of Price-Fixed Product to Sue Manufacturer on 
Federal Antitrust Claim, 55 A.L.R. FED. 919, 922 n.3 (1981). Thus, a direct 
purchaser "passes-on" the monopoly price to an indirect purchaser. 
22. Ill. Brick Co., 431 V.S. at 723-24 (explaining Hanover Shoe, Inc., 392 V.S. 
481). There was some scholarly debate regarding the "victory" of Hanover 
Shoe for consumers because indirect purchasers could still conceivably join 
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Nearly a decade later, the Supreme Court examined the indirect 
purchaser doctrine as a cause of action in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois. 23 
Illinois, engaged in construction contracts with various masonry con-
tractors, brought suit as an indirect purchaser against various manu-
facturers of concrete blocks that had engaged in illegal price fixing. 24 
The Court held that an indirect purchaser, or a purchaser that has the 
monopoly price "passed-on" to it, could not recover antitrust claims 
against an alleged antitrust violator. 25 
B. The Policy Supporting the Rule of Illinois Brick and Recognized 
Exceptions 
"[AJ little slopover on the shoulders of the wrongdoers. . .. We do 
not find this risk acceptable. »26 
The Illinois Brick Court looked to several policy reasons in crafting a 
rule that prevented both an indirect purchaser claim and an indirect 
purchaser defense.27 One of the Court's concerns was an "unwilling-
ness to complicate treble-damages actions" with complex accounting 
data and calculations in an already complex litigation.28 Inherent in 
this concern was the difficulty calculating whether the indirect pur-
chaser had actually received the full monopoly price increase when it 
purchased the consumer good from the direct purchaser.29 If the di-
rect purchaser absorbed either partially or completely, any portion of 
the monopoly overcharge, then damages to the indirect purchaser 
would be lower or disappear altogether.3o Thus, a direct purchaser's 
an antitrust lawsuit with a direct purchaser. See Kassis, supra note 19, at 
1098-99. 
23. 431 U.S. 720. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 736, 745-47. 
26. Id. at 731 n.ll. 
27. Id. at 751 (Brennan, j., dissenting). The indirect purchaser defense is 
equivalent to a "defensive passing-on" of costs; likewise, the indirect pur-
chaser claim is equivalent to an "offensive passing-on" of costs. Id. at 750 
n.5; see also Jerry L. Beane, Passing-On Revived: An Antitrust Dilemma, 32 BAY-
LOR L. REv. 347, 363-64 (1980) (discussing the theory behind "offensive" 
and "defensive passing-on"). 
28. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 725. 
29. Id. at 732-33 n.13. The Court in Hanover Shoe, Inc. explained that "[a] wide 
range offactors influence a company's pricin~ policies." 392 U.S. 481, 492 
(1968). Even if the actual cost calculations 'in the real economic world" 
could determine that any pricing change was a result of passing-on the mo-
nopoly charge to indirect consumers, it would be nearly impossible to 
prove that the direct purchaser would not have raised its prices absent the 
monopoly charge. Id. at 493. In fact, the Court in Hanover Shoe believed 
that such a showing was "virtually unascertainable" and "the task would nor-
mally prove insurmountable." Id. 
30. Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1170 (8th Cir. 1998). 
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claim would be less complicated and a more efficient use of judicial 
and private resources.31 
In order to place the act of recognizing damages for an indirect 
purchaser in perspective, it is helpful to recognize the "relative ease" 
in which a direct purchaser may prove damages. Mter a judicial deter-
mination of an antitrust violation, a direct purchaser must have "proof 
of some damage."32 In turn, damages are calculated by the finder of 
fact to a lesser standard of approximation and subsequently trebled.33 
Of course, a direct purchaser plaintiff lacking direct evidence of an 
antitrust violation must rely on expert witnesses. A direct purchaser's 
evidentiary threshold for using an expert witness is controlled largely 
by a judicial determination of the expert's scientific foundation based 
on Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael. 34 
The Court's second reason for barring an indirect purchaser de-
fense and its concomitant indirect purchaser claim was because ex-
cluding a direct purchaser from antitrust litigation would decrease the 
deterrent effect of antitrust laws.35 For example, in Hanover Shoe, 
United Shoe was barred from showing that Hanover had passed-on 
the monopoly overcharge to the ultimate consumer, or indirect pur-







Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 732-33 & n.13. 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 & n.9 
(1969) (holding that "proof of some damage" from illegal conspiracy of 
overseas patent pools was enough to show a compensable injury under § 4 
of the Clayton Act for a damages determination); Bigelow v. RKO Radio 
Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946) (holding that a showing of some 
damage, even when not specific, from an unlawful violation of federal anti-
trust laws was sufficient to support a treble-damages verdict). 
Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 264. RKO explained several examples where plaintiffs' 
approximation of damages were inexact, yet sufficient for a reasonable jury 
to calculate treble damages. Id. at 263-64. Part of the Court's holding in-
cluded recognition that RKO and its co-defendants' "wrongful action had 
prevented [plaintiffs] from making any more precise proof of the amount 
of damage." Id. at 266. 
526 U.S. 137 (1999). The Court in Kumho Tire explained that the "standard 
of evidentiary reliability" of any expert witness is controlled largely by the 
judicial analysis performed in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc. See id. at 
149 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993)). The Court in Daubert held 
that the trial judge's determinations may be guided by at least four factors: 
(1) "[w]hether a theory or technique ... has been tested"; (2) "[w]hether it 
'has been subjected to peer review"'; (3) "[w]hether it has a 'known or 
potential rate of error"'; and (4) "[w]hether it enjoys 'general accept-
ance.'" Id. at 149-50 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94). Maryland courts 
would probably apply a similar standard for an economic expert in an anti-
trust claim. See Buxton v. Buxton, 363 Md. 634, 650, 770 A.2d 152, 161 
(2001) . 
See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481,494 (1968). 
An indirect purchaser defense would be implicit in allowing a right by indi-
rect purchasers to file antitrust claims for treble damages. Id. 
Id. at 493-94. The debate over to what extent a direct purchaser passes-on 
the monopoly overcharge continues today. See infra notes 47-50 and accom-
panying text. This debate between economic models was exactly the type 
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the exact amount of the monopoly overcharge to the indirect con-
sumer, an indirect purchaser defense would render Hanover's treble-
damage claim useless, as they would have suffered no actual 
damages.37 
If Hanover Shoe, the direct purchaser, was barred from a claim by 
an indirect purchaser passing-on defense (assuming a penny for 
penny pass-on of the monopoly overcharge), indirect purchasers 
themselves "would have only a tiny stake in the lawsuit and hence little 
incentive to sue."38 Even if some of the smaller indirect purchasers 
were to succeed in their antitrust claims, in spite of the daunting cost 
of antitrust litigation, the deterrent effect of treble damages to a small 
claim would be considerably weaker than the treble-damages award 
from the direct purchaser that bore the full brunt of the alleged mo-
nopoly price increase.39 Without a significant incentive for an injured 
party to sue, the Court feared that the alleged antitrust violator would 
maintain its monopoly profit, legally protected by the indirect pur-
chaser defense against the wholly damaged direct purchaser, and insu-
lated against the significantly smaller claims by the indirect purchaser 
plain tiffs. 40 
The Court's third concern was to protect antitrust defendants from 
the risk of multiple awards for one liability. 41 In Illinois Brick, 
of accounting complexity that Hanover Shoe sought to avoid. Hanover Shoe, 
Inc., 392 U.S.at 492-93. 
37. See id. at 493. 
38. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 725-26 (citing Hanover Shoe, Inc., 392 U.S. at 494). 
In theory, this "tiny stake" would be the actual damages suffered by the 
individual consumer, which could be estimated on a per unit basis as the 
amount of the monopoly overcharge per unit passed-on by the direct pur-
chaser (assuming such a calculation could be performed) and multiplied 
by the number of units the indirect purchaser actually purchased. While it 
would be inevitable that private party indirect purchasers, if they were able, 
would seek class certification, it brings the added difficulty of class certifica-
tion in indirect purchaser lawsuits. See generally Chris S. Coutroulis & D. 
Matthew Allen, The Pass-on Problem in Indirect Purchaser Class Litigation, 44 
ANTITRUST BULL. 179, 184-86 (Spring 1999). It is enough to acknowledge 
that a significant number of lawsuits from indirect purchaser plaintiffs in an 
Illinois Brick repealer state are defeated through a denial of class certifica-
tion. See id. at 187; see also William H. Page, The Limits of State Indirect Pur-
chaser Suits: Class Certification in the Shadow of Illinois Brick, 67 ANTITRUST 
LJ. 1, 13 (1999). 
39. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 734. 
40. See Hanover Shoe, Inc., 392 U.S. at 494. The overall deterrent effect of anti-
trust laws relies on four prongs of enforcement: the DOj, the FTC, state 
attorneys general, and private parties, all bringing potential antitrust law-
suits against alleged antitrust violators. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw, POLICY AND PROCEDURE 69 (4th ed. 1999). 
4l. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 730. Some scholars hypothesize that trial judges 
are less likely to find liability for any indirect purchaser treble-damage anti-
trust claim, therefore reducing the liability rather than the amount of the 
damages awarded. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages 
Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO ST. LJ. 115, 163 (1993). 
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"[p]rivate treble-damages actions brought by the masonry contractors, 
general contractors, and private builders were settled, without 
prejudice to [Illinois'] lawsuit."42 If direct purchasers were allowed to 
recover for the full amount of the overcharge for the monopoly price, 
then the indirect purchasers might be able to recover the same 
amount from the defendant absent a legal bar to their claim.43 Lastly, 
the Court recognized that procedural devices would be ineffective in 
preventing this possible multiple liability, especially when potential 
parties had either received judgment or settlement in advance.44 
Before Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick, the Court had generally inter-
preted § 4 of the Clayton Act to protect all victims of antitrust viola-
tions. 45 In Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick, however, the Court 
determined that neither the defensive use of "passing-on" in Hanover 
Shoe, nor the offensive use of "passing-on" were permitted. These rul-
ings effectively limited an alleged antitrust violator's litigation liability 
to its immediate purchasers.46 The most prevailing reasons for an 
equal bar to a passing-on defense and a passing-on claim were the 
uncertainties and complexities the courts would face in accounting 
for damages to both direct purchasers and the amount of the over-
charge passed onto indirect purchasers without overlapping liabilities 
to the defendant.47 
This same complexity in litigation was a significant factor prevent-
ing Illinois Brick from abandoning altogether the rule of Hanover 
Shoe.48 While the Court deferred somewhat to stare decisis in refusing 
to overturn Hanover Shoe,49 the main reason for expanding Hanover 
Shoe to limit offensive use of passing-on was to prevent "whole new 
dimensions of complexity" to treble-damage lawsuits and increasing 
judicial economy. 50 
42. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 727 n.5. 
43. Id. at 730. The converse of this would also be true. Id. If the indirect 
purchaser was able to recover all, or part, of the monopoly overcharge 
before the direct purchaser, then the direct purchaser might be able to 
recover the full amount of the monopoly charge and the defendant would 
incur the multiple liability. Id. 
44. Id. at 731 n.ll. The impact of settled antitrust cases on damages awards 
cannot be underestimated. One study conducted on over 2,350 antitrust 
cases filed between 1973 and 1983, in five district courts, found that almost 
three-fourths of the private party antitrust lawsuits settled. Steven C. Salop 
& Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Party Antitrust Litigation, 74 
CEO. LJ. 1001, 1010 (1986). 
45. See Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 729,748; see also supra notes 17-19 and accompa-
nying text. 
46. See Beane, supra note 27, at 363. 
47. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 731 n.ll. 
48. Id. at 737-38. 
49. Id. at 736-37. 
50. Id. at 737. The Court feared both the complexity of the accounting and the 
complexity of bringing all of the potential plaintiffs through joinder, ren-
dering private antitrust enforcement ineffective. See id. at 739-40. For a 
discussion of the economic complexities supporting Illinois Brick, see Wil-
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The Court also suggested two exceptions to Illinois Brick that lower 
courts have embraced to varying degrees. 51 A cost-plus exception ex-
ists for those indirect purchaser plaintiffs that purchase products 
under a fixed mark-up, fixed quantity contract negotiated prior to the 
alleged monopoly price increase.52 The second exception occurs 
"where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer."53 
C. The Illinois Brick Repealers 
But the ruling in Illinois Brick creates a situation equally or even 
more unfair. It permits the middleman to collect twice-to reap the 
profits of overcharges from the consumer, and then to charge the 
manufacturer for the illegality. And it leaves the one party injured 
in fact-the consumer-wholly uncompensated. 54 
The congressional backlash to Illinois Brick's interpretation of the 
Clayton Act was quick, but ineffective. Justice White's request to Con-
gress to amend § 4 of the Clayton Act55 went effectively unanswered.56 
State legislatures and state appellate courts were more receptive to 
"repealing"57 Illinois Brick in applications of their respective state anti-
liam M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Stand-
ing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois 
Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 602 (1979); but see Harris & Sullivan, supra note 3. 
51. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 735. 
52. Id. at 733 n.12, 735-36. 
53. Id. at 736 n.16. Davidson's claim had hoped to fall under either of these 
exceptions but failed. See infra note 103. For a synopsis of these excep-
tions, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, 
103 HARv. L. REv. 1717, 1718-20 (1990). 
54. 125 CONGo REc. 1459 (1979) (statement of Sen. E. Kennedy). Legal and 
business scholars agree that "it is virtually certain that no part of the [anti-
trust damages] award will find its way to the indirect purchasers who bore 
part or all of the offensive price increase." Harris & Sullivan, supra note 3, 
at 298. 
55. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 733 n.14. Senator Kennedy and Congressman 
Rodino introduced legislation to repeal the Court's holding in Illinois Brick 
in 1978 and 1979, but failed to have their bills passed by Congress. Harris 
& Sullivan, supra note 3, at 271-72. The Illinois Brick ruling may have been a 
particularly bitter pill for Congressman Rodino, co-sponsor of the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.c. § 15(c) 
(1976), when Justice White effectively rendered the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act 
useless in interpreting a private party's cause of action as an indirect pur-
chaser because of its "unclear intent" concerning the passing-on issues pre-
sent in Hanover Shoe. See Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 733 n.14; see also 122 
CONGo REc. 30883 (1976) (statement of Rep. Flowers). 
56. For a list of federal circuit courts and cases that authorized indirect pur-
chasers in an antitrust treble-damage claim and were subsequently over-
ruled, see Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 754 n.lO. 
57. Federal antitrust laws, based on the Commerce Clause, Article I, Section 8 
of the Constitution, are not repealed by an act of state sovereignty. Rather, 
the" Illinois Brick repealer" is a subtle misnomer; the Illinois Brick repealers 
simply allow a cause of action to indirect purchasers pursuant to state anti-
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trust statutes. Since Illinois Brick, several states have generally allowed 
some type of indirect purchaser claims for damages pursuant to state 
antitrust or consumer protection laws.58 
For purposes of this discussion, states allowing indirect purchasers 
an antitrust cause of action for damages generally fall into one of two 
categories. 59 The first category of states are those with explicit re-
pealer statutes. An explicit Illinois Brick repealer statute will generally 
allow indirect purchasers to bring claims for plaintiffs in one, or any 
combination of the following: (1) state and political subdivisions as 
indirect purchasers; (2) state attorney generals as parens patriae on be-
half of citizens that are indirect purchasers; and (3) private party indi-
rect purchasers.6o 
These explicit repealer statutes survived judicial scrutiny in ARC 
America when the Supreme Court held that Illinois Brick did not pre-
empt state antitrust laws allowing claims from indirect purchasers.61 
trust law where a similar claim under federal law would be barred and 
where federal statutes do not preempt state law. See infra notes 61-68 and 
accompanying text. 
58. See Kevin]. O'Connor, Is the Illinois Brick Wall Crumbling?, 15 ANTITRUST 34, 
34-35 (2001); see also Greene et aI., supra note 3, at 1153-55. 
59. Professor O'Connor actually describes three categories of indirect pur-
chaser actions for damages: (1) by, or on behalf of, indirect purchasers; (2) 
on behalf of state indirect purchasers; and (3) on behalf of consumers, 
under either consumer protection or unfair trade practices laws. 
O'Connor, supra note 58, at 34-35. In comparison, Professor Page pre-
ferred categorizing indirect purchaser suits into two broad categories: (1) 
states that allow indirect purchaser suits with explicit Illinois Brick repealers; 
and (2) states that allow indirect purchaser claims based on antitrust or 
consumer protection statutes predating the Illinois Brick decision. Page, 
supra note 38, at 2. 
60. See Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 733 n.12, 735-36. For an example of a statute 
with Illinois Brick repealers through consumer protection laws, see CONN. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 35-32, 35-35 (1997) (allowing the Attorney General to "bring 
an action ... as ... parens patriae for persons residing in the state" and 
"[ t] he state ... shall recover treble damages"). For examples of states with 
complete explicit Illinois Brick repealers, see ALA. CODE § 6-5-60(a) (1993) 
(allowing recovery by "[a]ny person ... injured or damaged ... direct or 
indirect"); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a) (West 1997) (allowing re-
covery "regardless of whether such injured person dealt directly or indi-
rectly with the defendant"); MINN. STAT. § 325D.57 (1995) (allowing 
recovery by any person "injured directly or indirectly"); and MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 75-21-9 (1999) ("any person ... injured or damaged ... direct or 
indirect") . 
61. 490 U.S. 93, 103 (1989) (holding that state indirect purchaser statutes were 
not preempted because Illinois Brick was an interpretation of § 4 of the Clay-
ton Act and as such has no bearing on the availability of recovery to indirect 
private purchasers under state antitrust laws). It is an item of antitrust trivia 
that Justice White authored Hanover Shoe, Illino~ Brick, and ARC America, 
explicitly barring a federal indirect passing-on defense and offense, and 
permitting states the opportunity to create such indirect defensive and of-
fensive passing-on rights. Id. at 103; see also Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 735-36; 
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 488 
(1968) . 
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In ARC America, appellant California sought treble damages as an indi-
rect purchaser pursuant to the establishment of a settlement fund in a 
cement antitrust class action.62 The trial court and the Ninth Circuit 
held that the direct purchasers, including ARC America, should re-
ceive the distribution of the $32 million settlement fund because indi-
rect purchasers were barred from recovery under Illinois Brick.63 The 
Ninth Circuit further reiterated the three purposes behind Illinois 
Brick as follows: "avoiding unnecessarily complicated litigation; provid-
ing direct purchasers with incentives to bring private antitrust actions; 
and avoiding multiple liability of defendants."64 
In overturning the Ninth Circuit, the Court explained that Illinois 
Brick was merely ajudicial interpretation of the Clayton Act, not a "de-
cision defining the interrelationship between the federal and state an-
titrust laws."65 Because federal antitrust laws like the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts were created to allow federal antitrust law to supplement 
existing state antitrust statutes and common law,66 there was neither 
express preemption by Congress nor an "obstacle to the accomplish-
ment" of Congress' objectives by enforcing a seemingly contrary state 
antitrust statutory scheme.51 Lastly, the Court explained that indirect 
purchaser claims pursuant to state antitrust laws would have no effect 
on lessening the incentive of direct purchasers in pursuing their fed-
eral claims in federal courts.68 
The second category of states repealing Illinois Brick are those states 
that recognize indirect purchasers having an antitrust cause of action 









ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 97-99. 
Id. at 99. 
Id. (citing In re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., 817 F.2d 1435, 1445 
(9th Cir. 1987». 
Id. at 105. 
See id. at 102 (interpreting 21 CONGo REc. 2457 (1890) (remarks of Sen. 
Sherman»; see also MORRIS D. FORKOSCH, ANTITRUST AND THE CONSUMER, 
32-170 (1956) (analyzing the legislative history of the Sherman Act). 
ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 102. The Court further explained that state 
antitrust laws achieved the same purpose as federal antitrust laws; "deter-
ring anticompetitive conduct and ensuring compensation of victims of that 
conduct." Id. 
Id. at 104. Some scholars attribute the decision in ARC America as a victory 
for Reagan Federalism. For a recent article addressing this topic, see Don-
ald I. Baker, Federalism & Futility: Hitting the Potholes on the Illinois Brick 
Road, 17 ANTITRUST 14 (2002). 
See generally Bunker's Glass Co. v. Pilkington PLC, 47 P.3d 1119 (Ariz. Ct. 
App.2002) (interpreting section 44-1408 of the 1994 Arizona Revised Stat-
utes to include a cause of action for indirect purchasers without explicit 
statutory language repealing Illinois Brick); Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 646 
N.W.2d 440 (Iowa 2002) (interpreting section 553.12 of the 1997 Iowa 
Code to include a cause of action for all purchasers, including indirect pur-
chasers, without explicit statutory language repealing Illinois Brick and de-
spite legislative directive to be guided by federal antitrust interpretations); 
Hyde v. Abbot Labs., 473 S.E.2d 680 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (interpreting 
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ply interpret seemingly ambiguous state antitrust statutes as including 
all purchasers, including indirect purchasers. 
D. The Maryland Antitrust Acfo 
"It is the intent of the General Assembly that, in construing this sub-
title, the courts be guided by the interpretation given by the federal 
courts to the various federal statutes dealing with the same or similar 
matters . . . . ,J7l 
In 1972, the Maryland General Assembly enacted House Bill No.1, 
the MATA, which is codified at sections 11-201 to 11-213 of the Com-
mercial Law Article of the Maryland Code. 72 The MATA was the first 
explicit statutory regulation of antitrust activity under Article 41 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights.73 
Section 11-202 of the Maryland Commercial Code states the general 
purpose and construction of the MATA.74 Three provisions of this 
section are relevant to the discussion of Davidson. 
First, the General Assembly "declares that the purpose of this subti-
tle is to com~lement the body of federal law governing restraints of 
trade .... " 5 When this guidance is coupled with the Supreme 







section 75-16 of the 1990 North Carolina General Statutes to include indi-
rect purchasers without an explicit directive because the Rule of Illinois 
Brick did not exist when the statute was drafted in 1969). But see Major v. 
Microsoft Corp., 60 P.3d 511, 513 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002) (interpreting sec-
tion 205 of the 2002 Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act, allowing "any person 
who is injured," as consistent with federal antitrust laws and thus preclud-
ing an indirect purchaser claim). 
The MATA refers to both the original legislation and the current antitrust 
statute. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-213 (2000). This comment will 
refer to both the original 1972 act, as codified in 1975, and the current 
statute as the MATA; however, references to the 1975 statute that have been 
amended or changed will be cited accordingly. Likewise, the MATA provi-
sions that have remained unchanged since 1972 will be cited to the 2000 
code. 
Id. § 11-202 (emphasis added). 
William L. Reynolds, II & James B. Wright, A Practitioner's Guide to the Mary-
land Antitrust Act, 36 MD. L. REv. 323, 323 & n.2 (1976). 
Id. at 323. "[M]onopolies are odious, contrary to the spirit of free govern-
ment and the principles of commerce, and ought not to be suffered." MD. 
CaNST. art. 41. Despite this historic first codification of Maryland's consti-
tutional antitrust powers, there were no reported private actions under the 
MATA during its first four years of existence. Reynolds & Wright, supra 
note 72, at 349. In comparison, three cases touching the MATA, including 
Davidson v. Microsoft, have been reported between 1999 and 2002. See Mar-
tello v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Md., Inc., 143 Md. App. 462, 795 A.2d 
185 (2002); Davidson II, 143 Md. App. 43, 792 A.2d 336 (2002); Electronics 
Store, Inc. v. Cellco P'ship, 127 Md. App. 385, 732 A.2d 980 (1999). 
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-202. 
Id. § 11-202(a)(I). 
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eral antitrust laws were designed to complement existing state and 
common law antitrust laws, it creates a curious statutory interpretation 
scheme similar to the "chicken-egg" truism.76 If a deciding court were 
to interpret an ambiguous Maryland antitrust law, it would be guided 
by section 11-202 (a) (1) to interpret the law as complementing ex-
isting federal law. 77 Under ARC America, those same federal statutory 
interpretations would be guided by legislative history from 1890, 
which indicates that federal antitrust laws merely "supplement, not 
displace, state antitrust remedies."78 In turn, if the antitrust issue was 
sufficiently ambiguous within the statute, this federal interpretation 
could lead the court back to 1867 and the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights for a common law solution, if one existed. 
Second, section 11-202(a) (2) states that courts should be "guided 
by the interpretations given by the federal courts to the various fed-
eral statutes dealing with the same or similar matters .... "79 This 
same section also explicitly lists the Clayton Act as one of the federal 
statutes to "guide" the Maryland courts.80 Within six years of the pas-
sage of the MATA, this guidance was held to be only persuasive, not 
binding, for interpreting Maryland antitrust statutes.81 
Lastly, section 11-201 lists an additional consideration for a court in 
interpreting its statutory language. Section 11-201 (b) provides "this 
subtitle shall be liberally construed to serve its beneficial purposes."82 
In civil antitrust lawsuits, section 11-209 of the 1975 Maryland Com-
mercial Code created causes of actions for both the state and for "a 
person."83 Subsection (b) (1) pertained explicitly to the United States, 
the state, and political subdivisions of the state, while subsection 
(b) (2) controlled lawsuits by private parties.84 In the original MATA, 










See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-202(a)(1). 
California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102 (1989). See supra notes 61-68 
and accompanying text. 
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-202(a)(2). 
Id. 
Quality Disc. Tires v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 282 Md. 7, 12,382 A.2d 
867,870 (1978) (holding that section 11-202(a)(2) of the Commercial Law 
Article of the Maryland Code advises a court "[to] be guided (but not 
bound) by the opinions of the federal courts under the federal antitrust 
laws" in determining the legal standard for a resale price maintenance 
claim under Maryland law). But see State v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 301 Md. 
63, 66-67, 482 A.2d 1, 2 (1984) (explaining that § 4 of the Sherman Act is 
"analogous" to section 11-209(a) of the Commercial Law Article of the Ma-
ryland Code). 
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-202(b) (1). 
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw § 11-209(b) (1975) (amended 1982). 
Id. Compare "[t]he United States, the State, and any political subdivision 
organized under the authority of the State is a person having standing to 
bring an action under this subsection" with "[a] person whose business or 
property has been iryured or threatened with injury by a violation of [sec-
tion] 11-204 may maintain an action for damages or for an injunction or 
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there is no explicit mention of either a direct purchaser or indirect 
purchaser cause of action.85 
Mter Illinois Brick, the Maryland General Assembly amended the 
MATA in 1982, explicitly allowing the state and its agencies to bring 
claims as indirect purchasers pursuant to Maryland law.86 This partial 
Illinois Brick repealer made no mention of either allowing or prevent-
ing private individual indirect claims for treble damages. While Mary-
land remained guided by federal antitrust jurisprudence in 
accordance with section 11-202 (a)(2) of the MATA,87 this "guidance" 
left the Maryland antitrust law ambiguous and open to interpretation 
for indirect purchaser antitrust claims made by private parties.s8 
IV. THE INSTANT CASE: DAVIDSON V. MICROSOFI' COR-
PORATION 
"(AJppellee had engaged in business practices in violation oj Jederal 
antitrust laws. '89 
A. Factual and Procedural Analysis oJDavidson 
In March 2000, Bobby Davidson and Tri-County Industries, two un-
related plaintiffs, brought suit against the Microsoft Corporation in 
the Circuit Court for Prince George's County on behalf of a class of 
Maryland consumers pursuant to the MATA.90 Both Mr. Davidson 
and Tri-County had purchased computers in 1999 containing 
Microsoft Windows 98 software.91 Both had also registered the owner-
both against any person who has committed the violation." [d. Title 11 
defines a person as "an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, 
partnership, association, two or more persons having a joint or common 
interest, or any other legal or commercial entity." MD. CODE ANN., COM. 
LAw II § 11-201(f) (2000). 
85. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw § 11-209(b) (1975) (amended 1982). 
86. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-209(b)(2) (ii) (2000). See sUfrra note 6 
and accompanying text. 
87. See sUfrra notes 75-81 and accompanying text. 
88. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-202 (a) (2). See generally 6 JULIAN O. 
VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAws & TRADE REGULATION § 120.08[1] [e] (2d 
ed. 2003) (noting that, before Davidson, private party indirect purchaser 
claims for damages were probably barred in Maryland). 
89. Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 46, 792 A.2d at 338. 
90. [d. at 45, 792 A.2d at 338; Davidson I, 2001 WL 514369, at *l. 
91. Davidson I, 2001 WL 514369, at *l. The plaintiffs subsequently amended 
their complaint on January 26,2001 to include a claim under the Maryland 
Consumer Protection Act alleging that Microsoft "failed to inform the 
plaintiffs that it was a monopoly and that it had illegally set the price of 
Windows 98." [d. at *2. The trial court later held that there was no such 
violation and dismissed this claim. [d. The court of special appeals later 
unanimously affirmed this dismissal in Davidson II. 143 Md. App. at 57,792 
A.2d at 345. 
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ship of that software with Microsoft in accordance with the corpora-
tion's End-User License Agreement ("EULA").92 
Concurrent with the Maryland antitrust claim was a similar action in 
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Pursuant 
to federal antitrust laws regarding the Microsoft operating system 
software and its interference with Java technology, Internet Web 
browsers, and office software applications, Judge Frederick Motz con-
solidated sixty-one claims against Microsoft.93 
The plaintiffs' memorandum opposing both Microsoft's Motion to 
Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment specified the importance 
of the EULA between Microsoft and the end-user.94 These EULAs 
were described as "take it or leave it" propositions that must be en-
tered when the end-user first "chooses" to use the software.95 The 
court stated that these contracts transfer a user license to the end-
user; neither the end-user nor the original equipment manufacturer 
("OEM") ever purchase or receive title to the software during the 
transaction.96 
Judge Motz's decision dismissed all of the claims brought by indi-
rect purchasers pursuant to Illinois Brick.97 Although the plaintiffs did 
not directly purchase the software from Microsoft, they alleged that 
the actual product purchased was the EULA, which "ran directly be-
tween Microsoft and themselves."98 The court acknowledged that, 
while the EULA was a licensing agreement directly between Microsoft 
and the consumer, the actual purchase of this perpetual license of the 
operating system software occurred between Microsoft and the OEM, 
and then between the OEM and the consumer.99 
On February 14, 2001, the trial court in Davidson I dismissed the 










Davidson I, 2001 WL 514369, at *l. 
In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 704-08 (D. Md. 
2001). As a result of the federal criminal antitrust lawsuit showing that 
Microsoft had exercised illegal monopoly power in violation of § 2 of the 
Sherman Act, seventy-three antitrust cases against Microsoft were not con-
solidated in Judge Motz's court because they provided no basis for federal 
jurisdiction. Id. at 705 n.l. Fifty-eight of those cases were pending at the 
time of Judge Motz's decision. Id. 
Id. at 705-06. 
Id. at 706. 
Id. In fact, the OEM's sole function in the EULA is merely to deliver the 
EULA to the end-user; the OEMs have a separate license with Microsoft 
allowing them to pre-install Microsoft software on their computers. Id. at 
705-06. 
Id. at 709-13. 
Id. at 709. 
Id. Judge Motz's opinion also discussed claims of foreign parties, plaintiffs' 
motion for remand, dismissal of some antitrust claims under their respec-
tive state laws, and an order certifying his decision for an interlocutory ap-
peal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292. Id. at 705. 
Davidson 1,2001 WL 514369, at *2. 
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sen" to "conform" the MATA to federal law in accordance with section 
11-202 of the Maryland Commercial Code. 101 In turn, the court held 
that end-users, like Mr. Davidson and Tri-County, were indirect pur-
chasers, in spite of the "direct" EULA between Microsoft and the 
plaintiffs. l02 Because there was no explicit mention of an Illinois Brick 
repealer for private indirect purchasers, and section 11-209 (b) (1) did 
provide a state indirect purchaser claim, the trial court held that the 
Rule of Illinois Brick barred the plaintiffs' claim.103 
B. Legal Analysis of Davidson 
The issue before the court in Davidson II was limited to the statutory 
construction of sections 11-202 and 11-209 of the MATA. I04 Judge 
James Eyler's majority opinion interpreted the guidance of section 11-
202(a) (2) as a directive: "courts are to be guided by the interpretation 
given by federal courts to the various federal statutes dealing with the 
same or similar matters." I 05 While the majority buttressed its interpre-
tation of section 11-209 with other arguments, its main argument 
rested in its view of federal precedent as binding through section 11-
202.106 
In interpreting section 11-202, the majority relied on State v. 
jonathan Logan, Inc., a state antitrust lawsuit regarding a resale price 
maintenance conspiracy in raincoats. 107 The court in jonathan Logan, 
Inc. interpreted section 11-209(a)(2) of the Commercial Code and 
held that an equity court could not award disgorgement where the 
statute was silent to that specific remedy. lOS Where the statute is si-
lent, jonathan Logan, Inc. further explained, it should be guided by 
federal interpretations of the federal statutory analog in accordance 
with the policy of section 11-202.109 Because analogous federal anti-
trust laws did not permit an equity judgment under an analogous stat-
ute, neither did the MATA. IIO 
Judge Sonner's dissent in Davidson II discounted the majority's in-
terpretation of section 11-202 and reliance on jonathan Logan, Inc. lII 
Judge Sonner explained that the majority erroneously interpreted the 
101. Id. at *1. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. 
102. Davidson I, 2001 WL 514369, at *2. 
103. Id. at *1. Judge Lamasney also held that neither of the two Illinois Brick 
exceptions-a cost plus contract or ownership of the direct purchaser-
applied. [d. at *2. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text for more 
analysis of these exceptions. 
104. See Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 49-51, 792 A.2d at 340-41. 
105. Id. at 50, 792 A.2d at 340-41 (citing MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-
202(a) (2) (2000». See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. 
106. See Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 50-51, 792 A.2d at 340-41. 
107. 301 Md. 63, 64,482 A.2d 1, 1 (1984). 
108. See id. at 70-76, 482 A.2d at 4-8. 
109. Id. at 75, 482 A.2d at 7. 
110. See id. 
111. Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 63-64,792 A.2d at 348-49. 
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guidance in section 11-202 as binding, rather than as a permissive in-
ference as described in Quality Discount Tires v. Firestone Tire. 112 He 
further explained that where the MATA may be ambiguous, Maryland 
courts are free to interpret the statute contrary to federallaw. 113 
The majority continued its analysis of section 11-209(b).1l4 While it 
stated that" [a] person ... may maintain an action for damages," the 
statute made no explicit mention of private parties as indirect pur-
chasers. 115 Next, the court defined a person as "an individual, corpo-
ration, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, two or 
more persons .... "116 The court held that this definition did "not 
purport to address the Illinois Brick issue."117 Thus, the majority held 
that the MATA was sufficiently ambiguous to require guidance from 
federal interpretations of Illinois Brick. 1 IS 
The maJority further buttressed its argument with evidence of indi-
rect legislative history. 11 9 In 1981, the Maryland General Assembly 
failed to pass an explicit Illinois Brick repealer statute for all plain-
tiffS.120 In 1982, section 11-209(b)(2) was amended, allowing the state 
and its agencies to bring indirect purchaser lawsuits, but was silent as 
to private parties.121 
The court also mentioned Senate Bill 484, which was drafted in 
2001 to explicitly allow a cause of action for indirect purchasers. 122 
The court explained in dicta that the bill's introduction and subse-
quent defeat in the Senate Judicial Committee by a six-to-five vote in-
dicated that there was no recognition of a private party indirect 
purchaser claim in the MATA. 123 
While the majority recognized that its reliance on Senate Bill 484's 
defeat was dicta, its reliance on Senate Bill 484 is further weakened in 
that it failed to explain that Senate Bill 484 also proposed more than a 
mere Illinois Brick repealer. 124 Senate Bill 484 actually proposed two 
changes to the MATA.125 First, it specifically proposed the repeal of 
















Id. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 61, 792 A.2d at 347 (citing Greenbelt Homes, 
Inc. v. Nyman Realty, Inc., 48 Md. App. 42, 48, 426 A.2d 394, 398 (1981)). 
Id. at 49, 792 A.2d at 340. 
Id. 
Id. at 50, 792 A.2d at 340 (explaining MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-
201(f) (2000)). See supra note 84. 
Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 50,792 A.2d at 340. 
See id. at 50-51, 56, 792 A.2d at 340-41, 344. 
Id. at 51, 792 A.2d at 34l. 
Id. 
Id. See supra notes 8~8 and accompanying text. 
Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 51 & n.4, 792 A.2d at 341 & n.4; S. 484, 2001 
Leg., 415th Sess. (Md. 2001). 
Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 51 & n.4, 792 A.2d at 341 & n.4. 
Id. 
S. 484, 2001 Leg., 415th Sess. (Md. 2001). 
Id. 
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ond, it proposed to overturn jonathan Logan, Inc. and explicitly allow 
the Attorney General to bring a farens patriae action for damages on 
behalf of Maryland consumers.12 
The court concluded its opinion with a brief explanation of the 
guiding policies of the Rule of Illinois Brick. 128 Judge James Eyler's 
majority opinion specifically cited the concern addressed in Hanover 
Shoe regarding the "massive evidence and complicated theories" in-
volved in calculating the actual overcharge passed-on to the con-
sumer/indirect purchaser. 129 Satisfied that the circuit court's holding 
met both the legal doctrine and the relevant public policy of Illinois 
Brick, the court of special appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal 
of the indirect purchaser's antitrust claim.130 
In contrast, Judge Sonner countered the maJority's policy argument 
behind Illinois Brick concerning the effectiveness of antitrust enforce-
ment through private party lawsuits. 131 Normally, direct purchasers, 
by virtue that they faced both the entire monopoly price and suffered 
the largest monopoly damages, have the greatest incentive to bring a 
complex, expensive antitrust lawsuit. 132 With the advent of internet 
browsers and modern personal computers, Judge Sonner recognized 
that there had been a fundamental change of circumstances since Illi-
nois Brick in 1977.133 When software direct purchasers have a greater 
incentive to sell the monopoly product at the monopoly price, and the 
indirect purchasers are estopped by a judicial bar, there is no private 
party entering antitrust litigation and thus, no deterrent effect. 134 
After countering the majority's interpretation of both section 11-
202 and the policy behind Illinois Brick, the dissent argued that claims 
by indirect purchasers were permitted within section 11_209. 135 Rec-
ognizing that the MAT A section 11-209 serves the "same purpose" as 
the Clayton Act, 136 Judge Sonner explained that section 11-209 pur-
ports no explicit distinction between a "person" as a direct or indirect 
purchaser in an antitrust claim.137 
Judge Sonner turned to statutory construction to determine the leg-













Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 47-50, 792 A.2d at 339-40. See supra Part II.A-B. 
Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 48-49,792 A.2d at 340 (citing Ill. Brick Co., 431 
U.S. 720, 741 (1977) (explaining Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. 
Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968»). See supra notes 27-53 and accompanying text. 
Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 56-57, 792 A.2d at 344-45. 
Id. at 57-64, 792 A.2d at 345-48 (Sonner, j., dissenting). 
See id. at 61 n.2, 792 A.2d at 347 n.2 (citing Hanover Shoe, Inc., 392 U.S. at 
494). 
Id. at 59, 792 A.2d at 346. 
See id; supra note 40 and accompanying text (describing the four prongs of 
antitrust deterrence). 
Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 59-63, 792 A.2d at 346-48. 
Id. at 60, 792 A.2d at 346. 
Id. at 62, 792 A.2d at 348. 
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find one where none exists."138 The statutory purpose of the MATA, 
pursuant to section 11-202, is "to protect the public and foster fair and 
honest intrastate competition."139 The Maryland General Assembly 
recommended a liberal construction 140 "that harmonizes the general 
scheme of the statute."141 Lastly, Judge Sonner warned the majority 
that statutory construction should rely on the General Assembly's ac-
tions, not the General Assembly's failure to act in not explicitly provid-
ing for an indirect purchaser remedy.142 
Judge Sonner concluded his argument with the holding in ARC 
America that federal antitrust law had not preempted the field of state 
antitrust law. 143 Recognizing that state antitrust law was not pre-
empted by federal law, Judge Sonner cited several jurisdictions that, 
pursuant to state antitrust law, allowed claims by an indirect purchaser 
in cases where the indirect purchaser provisions were ambiguous.144 
V. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS REVEALS THE THEORETICAL UN-
DERPINNINGS OF ILLINOIS BRICK 
"[T] his Court has reconsidered its decisions construing the Sherman 
Act when the theoretical underpinnings of those decisions are called 
into serious question. "145 
The court of special appeals failed to reach the economic underpin-
nings of the Rule of Illinois Brick in Davidson. Relying on a quarter-
century old legal principle in an area of law significantly influenced by 
economic theory, Maryland's first reported decision embraces the 
Rule of Illinois Brick where it is not explicitly repealed. 146 As such, 
private persons, as indirect purchasers, are legally barred from dam-











Id. "We must apply principles of construction that render a common sense 
reading of statutory terms in light of the overriding purpose and goal of the 
statute." Id. (citing Haigley v. Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, 128 Md. 
App. 194, 222, 736 A.2d 1185, 1200 (1999) (quoting Martin v. Beverage 
Capital Corp., 353 Md. 388, 399, 726 A.2d 728,734 (1999»). 
Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-202(a)(l) (2000». 
Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-202(b)(I». 
Id. (citing Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 1l5, 125, 48 A.2d 754, 759 
(1946» . 
Id. at 62-63, 792 A.2d at 348 (citing Police Comm'r of Baltimore City v. 
Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 420-21, 379 A.2d 1007, 1012 (1977». 
Id. at 63,792 A.2d at 348 (citing California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 
105-06 (1989». 
See id. at 64,792 A.2d at 349 (citing Hyde v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 473 S.E.2d 
680,683 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996); Blake v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 1996 WL 134947, 
at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1996»; see also supra note 69 and accompany-
ing text. 
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 21 (1997) (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 52, 792 A.2d at 342. The Rule of Illinois Brick 
may be re-examined by the Supreme Court in Verizon Communications, Inc. 
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seek injunctive relief, they are forced to rely on direct purchasers to 
deter exercises of monopoly power on the price of consumer 
goods. 148 
Barring these potential remedies, private party indirect purchasers 
seeking monetary damages pursuant to the MATA will need to either 
support legislation explicitly repealing the Rule of Illinois Brick, or pro-
vide a sufficient argument to overcome the underlying principles be-
hind Illinois Brick as outlined in Part II. In either case, the discussion 
that follows is designed to facilitate that process by outlining both an 
applied and intrinsic economic course of action. 
A. Applied Analysis Demonstrates that Direct Purchasers May Have Neither 
the Most Effective Deterrent Effect on Antitrust Violators nor the Most 
Efficient Means to Uncover and Police Antitrust Violators 
An applied approach attacks the first two policy reasons behind the 
Rule of Illinois Brick: (1) that direct purchaser claims provide the most 
effective deterrence to antitrust violators; and (2) that direct purchas-
ers will provide the most efficient means of both policing antitrust 
violators and litigating those violations in court. 
First, the theory that direct purchasers provide "maximum deter-
rence" to bring private actions because they will bring the largest suits 
for treble damages is inherently flawed without sufficient empirical 
v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, L.L.P. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, L.L.P. v. 
Bell Atlantic Corp., 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002), em. granted sub nom. Verizon 
Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, L.L.P., 123 S. Ct. 
1480 (2003) (reviewing the Second Circuit's reversal of the district court's 
dismissal of Trinko's antitrust claim). In Law Offices of Curtis Trinko v. Bell 
Atlantic Carp., the Second Circuit allowed an indirect private party pur-
chaser to bring suit pursuant to the Sherman Antitrust Act because the in-
direct purchaser was directly harmed when "it received poor phone 
service[, from then Bell Atlantic,] because it chose to do business with [the 
direct purchaser]." 294 F.3d 307, 324-25 (2d Cir. 2002). If Maryland courts 
continue to rely on federal guidance in interpreting Maryland's antitrust 
law, pursuant to section 11-202 of the Commerical Law Code, then the Su-
preme Court's ultimate resolution of Verizon might impact Maryland's ad-
herence to Illinois Brick. 
148. See Davidson 11,143 Md. App. at 51,792 A.2d at 341 (citing State v.Jonathan 
Logan, Inc., 301 Md. 63, 64-65, 482 A.2d 1,1-2 (1984». The Rule of Illinois 
Brick prevents indirect purchaser claims for treble-monetary damages, not 
injunctive relief. See supra note 4. As such, a private party indirect pur-
chaser could bring an action for injunctive relief in Maryland. MD. CODE 
ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-209(b) (2000). As a lesser alternative to injunctive 
relief, the court may order restitution to Maryland consumers of an alleged 
antitrust violator in equity proceedings brought by the Maryland Attorney 
General to prevent or restrain violations of MATA section 11-204. /d. § 11-
209(a). While the statute explicitly permits restitution to "any person," it 
also explicitly recognizes that the court "may" use "all equitable powers" to 
fashion an appropriate remedy. Id. § 11-209. This provision regarding res-
titution damages and all equitable remedies has not been exercised by the 
court in a reported opinion. 
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studies supporting this proposition. 149 Over the long term, direct pur-
chasers will successfully pass-on 100% or more of the monopoly or car-
tel overcharge in a competitive market subject to constant returns to 
scale. 150 Some markets, based on maintaining a resale profit margin 
for the direct consumer, will pass-on more than 100% of the price 
increase in the long run. 151 Thus, many, if not most, direct purchas-
ers would have no actual damages to claim against an alleged antitrust 
violator and, in turn, have no actual deterrent effect on antitrust 
conduct. 
From an efficiency perspective, the issue is which party would be the 
most efficient litigator against the alleged antitrust violator. fllinois 
Brick supporters believe that direct purchasers have the lowest litiga-
tion cost and the greatest economic benefit.152 This model has two 
weaknesses; the first is that over time, the economic incentive or bene-
fit to a direct purchaser to pursue a private party antitrust claim is zero 
149. See Hovenkamp, supra note 53, at 1727. 
150. [d. at 1726-27. Professor Hovenkamp describes the overall market effect as 
follows: 
[I]fzero profits are earned by the marginal direct purchaser before 
the cartel or monopoly comes into existence, any absorption of 
overcharge will force at least some direct purchasers to earn nega-
tive returns. In the long run these dealers must exit from the mar-
ket. Equilibrium will be restored when the marginal firm is once 
again earning zero returns ... [when] the industry supply curve is 
perfectly elastic; thus the consumer price will go up by exactly as 
much as the overcharge. If the direct purchaser's resale market is 
competitive and subject to economies of scale, the final price to the 
consumers will actually increase by more than the cartel {or monopoly] 
overcharge . .. from the fact that costs go up as volume decreases in 
markets subject to scale economies. 
[d. at 1726 n.45 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Hovenkamp's fear 
was that in a competitive market, over time, where the majority of direct 
purchasers are dealers and retailers (like most American distribution mar-
kets), the bulk, if not all of the overcharge would be passed-on to the con-
sumer. [d. at 1727. 
151. See generally Robert L. Steiner, The Third Relevant Market, 45 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 719, 745-58 (Spring 2000). Steiner explained that the direct purchas-
ers of tobacco from the tobacco cartel in the retail tobacco market would 
pass-on price increases to maintain gross retail margins and thus, exploit 
the monopoly overcharge. [d. For example, assume that cigarettes can be 
manufactured at the marginal price of $0.90 and sold by a monopolist at a 
profitable market price of $1.00. The retailers of cigarettes resell their ciga-
rettes to consumers at an established gross margin of 20%, or $1.20. If the 
cigarette monopolist raises the price of cigarettes to a monopoly price of 
$2.00, the retailers will raise their prices to maintain their gross margin at 
20%, or $2.40. Thus, the indirect purchaser will see a $1.40 price increase 
for the $1.00 monopoly price increase. See id. Mr. Steiner also acknowl-
edged in his study that economic models based on perfectly competitive 
markets often predict/ass-through costs of less or more than 100%, de-
pending on supply an demand calculation assumptions. [d. at 746-47. 
152. See Landes & Posner, supra note 50, at 608-09. 
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or even negative. 153 The second weakness lies in the basis "that [di-
rect] purchasers suspect and actively investigate possible antitrust vio-
lations," and, by default, that direct purchasers are situated with the 
best information to pursue antitrust litigation. 154 The best source of 
information about an alleged antitrust violation is likely the violator's 
employees themselves. 155 
Since the economic incentive for a direct purchaser in the long run 
and an employee with no actual injury is zero, neither has a particu-
larly significant economic incentive to bring an antitrust lawsuit, which 
would provide a deterrent effect against an alleged antitrust violator. 
The employee of the alleged antitrust violator, however, by virtue of 
his or her actual information, would be the most efficient party to po-
lice antitrust violators. In contrast, the direct purchaser, for fear of 
retaliation by the monopoly manufacturer, may make a business deci-
sion not to pursue antitrust litigation. 
B. Incidence Analysis Can Effectively Demonstrate Pass-Through Costs to 
Consumers in Modern Markets156 
The policy underpinning Illinois Brick susceptible to intrinsic eco-
nomic analysis is that of the allegedly complex calculations required 
to show pass-through of the monopoly overcharge by the intermediary 
and direct purchasers to the ultimate indirect purchaser-the con-
sumer. 157 When calculating indirect purchaser damages, in contrast 
to direct purchaser damages, the burden on showing indirect pur-
chaser damages in Illinois Brick in 1977 seems daunting. 15s Modern 
economists have produced reasonable calculations for estimating pass-
through costs to indirect purchasers and, in turn, should be able to 








See Hovenkamp, supra note 53, at 1727-28; see also supra notes 150-51 and 
accompanying text. 
Hovenkamp, supra note 53, at 1728. Professor Hovenkamp was skeptical 
that direct purchasers are more likely to detect antitrust violations. See id. 
at 1729. In contrast, he offers a more practical test-the likelihood of de-
tection of an antitrust violation is probably proportional to the number of 
"detectives." Id. He recognized that federal government litigation, state 
attorneys general litigation, and federal antitrust investigations, settled 
without prosecution, consist of the bulk of the "detectors" of antitrust viola-
tors, not the direct purchasers themselves. See id. 
Id. As one analyst stated, "[wJhen actual participants and close students of an 
industry testify that something is so, it probably is so." Steiner, supra note 151, at 
751. 
Incidence theory is an economic theory related to the passing-on of costs 
that utilizes standard economic analysis tools and assumptions of neoclassi-
cal micro-economics. Harris & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 275-76. 
See id. at 269-71. 
See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
See Ronald Cotterill et aI., Beyond Illinois Brick: The Law and Economics of Cost 
Pass-Through in the ADM Price Fixing Case, 18 REv. INDUS. ORG. 45, 51 (2001) 
(explaining the calculation of pass-through prices with a non-linear de-
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A modern trend at the FTC, in determining whether a potential 
merger is substantially likely to lessen competition, is to conduct in-
trinsic economic analysis and calculate the post-merger price to the 
consumer.160 Some antitrust commentators and analysts have seized 
on a common hypothesis in merger law-if the actual change in price 
from the pending merger can be calculated and the pass-on of this 
price change on the consumer can be determined, then there is no 
need to calculate market definitions or surrogates to approve a hori-
zontal merger. 161 Instead, the FTC can determine if a horizontal 
merger will "tend to create a monopoly" or "substantially . . . lessen 
competition"162 by measuring the anticompetitive harm directly to the 
consumer. 
To frame the same hypothesis in the language of § 4 of the Clayton 
Act and the Rule of Illinois Brick, if the actual change in price directed 
by the alleged monopolist and suffered by the direct purchaser can be 
traced through the pass-on to the ultimate consumer, there would be 





mand culVe); C. Robert Taylor, Indirect Damages from Price Fixing: The Ala-
bama Lysine Case, 18 REv. INDUS. ORG. 33, 34-35 (2001) (explaining pass-
through of lysine prices in both a vertically integrated market and on a cost-
plus basis); but see Coutroulis & Allen, supra note 38, at 196, 198, 200, 204 
(explaining that the calculation of pass-through prices by incidence analysis 
of demand cUlVes and market factors to be an ineffective tool in litigating 
an titrust claims). 
See DEP'T OF ]USTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDE-
LINES (1997). The Horizontal Merger Guidelines selVe as an analytical tool 
describing the enforcement policies of the DO] and the FTC in reviewing 
horizontal mergers. Id. A significant portion of the Guidelines stress that 
the evaluation of surrogate market indicators, such as market definitions, 
market power, and market concentration using the Herlindahl-Hirschman 
Index, because the DO] and the FTC assume that actually calculating the 
ability of the post-merger firm to charge and sustain a monopoly price is 
too difficult. See id. While the legal analysis of pass-through costs from effi-
ciencies from a pending horizontal merger through these guidelines differs 
from the legal analysis in a § 4 Clayton Act violation, the economic analysis 
is identical because it analyzes a company's ability in the relevant market to 
pass-through changes in costs to ultimate consumers. See Harris & Sullivan, 
supra note 3, at 275-76. 
See generally Robert H. Lande & James Langenfield, From the Surrogates to 
Stories: The Evolution of Federal Merger Policy, 11 ANTITRUST 5 (1997). See also 
supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000). 
See Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 751 (Brennan,]., dissenting). Supporters of the 
Rule of Illinois Brick would quickly argue that the "apparent ease" of such 
calculations is no more than a myth and the basis for the legal bar. They 
argue, for example, that Microsoft distributed software to consumers 
through: (1) original equipment manufacturers; (2) direct purchasers; (3) 
mass market wholesalers; and (4) retailers. See Kenneth G. Elzinga and 
David E. Mills, PC Software, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 739, 777 (Spring 1999). 
Thus, Microsoft implies that determining the actual consumer cost is too 
difficult an exercise when one has to consider the impact of quantity dis-
counts and inconsistent pricing patterns throughout the multitude of distri-
bution chains. Id. at 778. In stark contrast, the dissent in Illinois Brick 
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A celebrated example of calculating pass-on charges in a horizontal 
merger occurred when the FTC reviewed the proposed Staples-Office 
Depot merger. 164 The FTC recognized at least three specific factors 
in calculating the pass-through of certain cost savings to consumers 
post-merger.1 65 These factors were: (1) the shape of the consumer 
demand curve; (2) the shape of the marginal cost line; and (3) the 
extent of competition in the market. 166 An identical showing of pass-
on pricing, based on the Staples model, could be utilized in an indi-
rect purchaser setting. 
Another example of such an analysis of pass-through costs in price-
fixing litigation focused on market demand elasticities in the manu-
facture of carbonated soft drinks ("CSD") from high fructose corn 
syrup ("HFCS") .167 This framework assumes basic assumptions that 
consumers have imperfect information about retail prices of the ulti-
mate product, CSD, and that the HFCS is used in fixed proportions to 
the final product, and is of very small relative value to the final price 
of the CSD.168 This framework produced an observed pass-through 
twenty-five years earlier explained that a jury could reasonably trace costs 
and damages along a complex distribution chain in Perkins v. Standard Oil 
Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969), where the plaintiff alleged a violation of the 
Robinson-Pattman Act. Ill. Brick Co., 420 U.S. at 751 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). The Perkins Court traced the passing-on of discriminatory low prices 
through four vertical steps and three horizontal levels in resolving whether 
Standard Oil would be liable for damages. Perkins, 395 U.S. at 645. By re-
moving an absolute bar on all indirect claims,Justice Brennan's dissent ad-
mitted that there would be cases where the plaintiff would "be unable to 
prove that the overcharge was passed-on" or the overcharge calculation 
would be only "approximately determinable." Ill. Brick Co., 420 U.S. at 759 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan acknowledged that such rea-
soned estimations were "required" in antitrust litigation. Id. At that point, 
a discernible jury could apply the Zenith and RKO standard. See supra notes 
32-33 and accompanying text. In situations where the indirect purchasers' 
damages are too remote, Justice Brennan recognized that the alleged anti-
trust violator should not be subjected to "multiple liability" and courts 
should use legal standing to prevent such cases from full litigation. Ill. Brick 
Co., 420 U.S. at 761 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Of course, a modern anti-
trust case would have to satisfy the evidentiary requirements for expert wit-
nesses in accordance with Daubert and Kumho Tire. See supra note 34 and 
accompanying text. 
164. See FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1090 (D.D.C. 1997). 
165. ORLEY AsHENFELTER ET AL., IDENTIFYING THE FIRM-SPECIFIC COST PASS-
THROUGH RATE, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Working Paper No. 217, 1-7 (1998). 
Essential to the preliminary injunction enjoining consummation of the pro-
posed Staples-Office Depot merger was the FTC showing that Staples ex-
pected pass-through efficiency to ultimate consumers was a mere fifteen to 
seventeen-percent savings, as opposed to Staples' proclaimed two-thirds sav-
ings of the new market efficiency to the consumer. FTC, 970 F. Supp. at 
1090. 
166. AsHENFELTER ET AL., supra note 165, at 6-7. 
167. Cotterill et aI., supra note 159, at 45. 
168. Id. at 47. 
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rate of 100% under "commonly observed" market demand elasticity169 
in competitive, I 70 monopolistic,171 and oligopolistic markets. 172 In 
comparison, if demand for the same product in the food manufactur-
ing industry is linear, then the market would seek to maximize prices 
and the pass-through would be less than 100%.173 
The key conclusion to calculating this HFCS price increase pass-
through is recognizing that the demand curve for a respective market 
is non-linear.174 Dr. Cotterill explained that the linear demand curve, 
or the classic linear supply-demand "X" curve, was a contrivance of 
economic textbooks, not empirical data. 175 In a monopolistic market 
with non-linear demand and constant elasticity of demand, the pass-
169. Id. at 48. Even with pertect information, the 100% pass-through was met 
when both the prices of inputs other than HFCS remain constant when 
output drops due to higher retail prices and assuming constant returns to 
scale. Id. at 47-48. For more explanation of these assumptions, see id. at 
48-49. 
170. A competitive market "maximizes both allocative efficiency (making what 
the consumer wants) and productive efficiency (using the least amount of 
resources)." Ernest Gellhorn, An Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 1975 
DUKE LJ. 1, 1 (197S). The market price in a competitive market can be 
characterized by numerous factors, including: (1) large numbers of buyers 
and sellers; (2) the quantity of products bought by an individual buyer or 
sold by an individual seller is so small as to not affect the overall market 
price; (3) products are homogeneous (buyers have no reason to choose a 
particular seller and vice versa); (4) all market members have pertect infor-
mation; and (S) new competitors can freely enter the market. !d. at 24-2S. 
Thus, a firm in a competitive market can maximize profits only by increas-
ing output in response to consumer demand or lowering its own cost of 
marginal production. See id. at 28-29. 
171. While strict definitions of monopolistic markets vary, factors useful in iden-
tifying a monopolistic market are: 1) a single seller; 2) unique products; 3) 
substantial barriers to entry into the market; and 4) impertect market 
knowledge. Gellhorn, supra note 170, at 29. Idealistically, a monopoly 
seller's output produces the output of the entire industry; realistically, the 
monopoly seller is one whose output is sufficiently large enough in propor-
tion to the total amount demanded by consumers that he can set his mar-
ket price to maximize his own profits. Id. at 29-30. Such a seller is insulated 
from the loss of consumers by the threat of entry by new competitors or 
replacement by substitute products (often called market inelasticity). !d. at 
33. Lastly, a monopolistic market is one where the single seller achieves 
supra-normal surplus profits at the cost of considerable allocative ineffi-
ciency (also dead-weight loss) due to resource misallocation without regard 
to consumer demand. Id. at 3S. 
172. In an oligopolistic market, sellers are so few that their price and output 
decisions become interdependent. Gellhorn, supra note 170, at 38. Be-
cause there are so few sellers in the market, any price or output change by 
one member can be cancelled immediately by another seller by changing 
their respective price or output. Id. Thus, these oligopolists act indepen-
dent of consumer demand in setting prices and achieve supra-normal 
prices and returns, much like in a monopolistic market. See id. at 41. 
173. Cotterill et aI., supra note IS9, at SO. 
174. Id. at S1. 
17S. Id. 
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through rate is always greater than 100%.176 Furthermore, even if 
elasticity demand became infinite to the monopolistic manufacturer, 
the pass-through rate decreases only to 100%.177 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While the Rule of Illinois Brick in Maryland has been decided by the 
court of special appeals, private party indirect purchasers have fewer 
avenues open to them for relief. Pursuant to the Maryland Commer-
cial Code, injunctive relief from an indirect purchaser's litigation, or 
undefined equitable relief from a court's discretion in a state's attor-
ney general's action, remain as possible alternate remedies.178 
A more aggressive private party indirect purchaser will need to ei-
ther lobby for legislation that amends the Maryland Commercial Code 
to explicitly "repeal" the Rule of Illinois Brick or attempt to survive 
summary judgment under the current statute and the decision of Da-
vidson. Lifting the Rule of Illinois Brick may increase the complexities 
of antitrust litigation initially, but state courts can relieve themselves 
of this additional burden with special masters to determine the extent 
of the pass-on.179 While it is possible that a current appeal to the Su-
preme Court may modify or eliminate the Rule of Illinois Brick alto-
gether, a private party litigant will likely need to overcome the 
substantial barrier in Davidson. To counter this bar, a private party 





Id. at 50. In contrast, Dr. Cotterrill also explained that the pass-through 
rate is always lOO% in a competitively structured, profit-maximizing market. 
Id. Monopoly or oligopoly markets may also exist with 100% pass-through 
where the demand curve is between constant elasticity and linear. Id. at 50-
51. 
Id. at 50. As elasticity of demand becomes infinite, consumers select substi-
tute products for the monopoly product and the monopoly market be-
comes broadened into a competitive market, including the broader market 
of the substitute products. Id. Analyses of theoretical markets by other 
scholars refute Dr. Cotterill's assertion that the pass-through could be 
greater than 100%. See, e.g., Harris & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 274-98 (ex-
plaining that a competitive market reseller would pass-through nearly 100% 
of the monopoly price, while a monopolist reseller would likely absorb 
more of the monopoly price and pass-through less than 100%). 
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-209 (2000). 
Greene et ai., supra note 3, at 1155. Greene, O'Connor, and Hubbard ex-
plain that such special masters have been used effectively in pass-on deter-
minations in oil overcharge litigation. Id. (citing In re Stripper Well 
Exemption Litigation, 578 F. Supp. 586 (D. Kan. 1985». The Stripper Well 
court believed that the burden of persuasion was on intermediate purchas-
ers to prove that they had not passed-on the overcharge to ultimate con-
sumers, which would be analogous to pass-on determinations for indirect 
purchaser litigation. Id. 
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and intrinsic economic analysis tools outlined in Part V to buttress its 
argument and survive summary judgment. lso 
Christopher Paul Dean 
180. See supra notes 149-77 and accompanying text. 
